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"THE PARENT I NEVER HAD": 
THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION OF ALTERNATIVES 
TO INCARCERATION 
JOHN M. SLOOP 
This .essa;: is d~veloped along two lines. First, I investigate contemporary arguments and 
pubhc dZSCUSSlOns from which the concept of "alternative punishments" is being 
constructed and speculate about the influence of these constructions on how prisoners, 
laws, and morality are viewed publicly. I suggest that the current construction of 
alternatives to incarceration encourage all members of our culture to accept and 
encourage dominant definitions of ''proper'' behavior. Second, I use the essay as a 
representation of the utility of recent moves to incorporate poststructuralist themes into 
communication studies, most notably those emerging from the recent discussion of a 
"critical rhetoric." 
I n late 1987, after being convicted of drug possession and driving while intoxi-cated, Maria Arnford faced sentencing by Texas District Court Judge Ted Poe. 
Because prisons in Texas were filled beyond capacity as a result of recent legisla-
tion that lengthened sentences for virtually all crimes in the state, Arnford was 
sentenced to an alternative and experimental form of punishment. Arnford's 
home, in effect, was transformed into a mediated prison. A video screen, camera, 
and transmitter were installed in her house, and authorities could monitor her at 
all times to be sure that she was at "home." Further, Arnford was asked at random 
times to provide urine samples in order to prove that she was indeed following 
orders to abstain from drugs and alcohol throughout the length of her sentence. 
According to the conditions of her sentence, Arnford was only permitted to leave 
her house for preapproved therapy appointments, community service, or church 
meetings. The gaze of the "state" was constantly fixed upon Arnford, its probe 
monitoring not only her movements but even the composition of her blood. When 
asked her assessment ofthe sentence, Arnford stated that "This program has been 
like a parent to me, the parent I never had."! 
Arnford's testimony, and that of others who have undergone alternative forms 
of punishment, or "smarter" punishment as it has recently been termed, has 
flooded the pages of newspapers and other popular publications with increasing 
regularity.2 These testimonies, and articles that discuss and debate alternative 
punishments, not only provide the public with information on these alternatives, 
but indeed "construct" the constitution of the "state," "criminals," and "law 
abiding citizens."3 As jails and prisons continue to overflow due to increased 
pressure for "tougher" punishments for drug usage, drunk driving, and crimes in 
general, corrections departments are forced to turn to alternative forms of punish-
ment.4 In this essay, I examine the public discourses that serve as the basis for the 
rhetorical construction of the concept of "alternative punishments," and speculate 
on the influence of this construction on our society's views of appropriate and 
effective criminal punishment. 5 In doing so, this essay seeks to demonstrate the 
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utility of recent moves to incorporate poststructuralist themes into communication 
studies, in general, and rhetorical criticism, in particular. I will begin, then, by 
situating this study within the ongoing integration of poststructuralist discourses 
with current rhetorical theory and criticism before proceeding to the analysis. 
CRITICAL RHETORIC AND RHETORICAL CRITICISM 
The past decade has witnessed an increased interest by rhetorical theorists and 
critics in poststructuralist forms of critique. This is most evident in the attention 
given to the work of Michel Foucault. Most of this attention, however, has centered 
on the "translation" of Foucault's ideas and those of other poststructuralist 
thinkers into the domain of rhetorical theory and criticism.6 This appetite for 
translation has, for the most part, overwhelmed the rhetorical scholar's desire and 
ability to move beyond a discussion of theory into critical practice. While I do not 
mean to disparage such theoretical work, I believe that it is essential for scholars to 
demonstrate the practical utility of poststructural notions by demonstrating how 
they can be used in critical practice. 
A recent attempt to incorporate structural and poststructural views of criticism 
into a viable approach to rhetorical criticism is offered by McKerrow.7 He calls his 
approach "critical rhetoric," which refers to the practice of pulling together 
"disparate scraps of discourse which, when constructed as an argument, serve to 
illuminate otherwise hidden or taken for granted social practices."8 McKerrow 
emphasizes that the practice of critical rhetoric results in the creation, rather than 
the explanation, of text. The focus of the critical rhetorician, then, is on the 
production of rhetorical discourse based on a close reading of existing documents. 
McKerrow's critical rhetoric approach to criticism relies on two general con-
cepts-the critique of domination and the critique of freedom. The critique of domina-
tion refers to an attempt to explicate how groups and individuals are oppressed 
and dominated by others. It is directed toward "an analysis of discourse as it 
contributes to the interests of the ruling class, and as it empowers the ruled to 
present their interests in a forceful and compelling manner."9 Hence, for example, 
a critique of domination might attempt to uncover the ways in which contempo-
rary discourses concerning Affirmative Action policies continue to marginalize 
"minority" groups and, ultimately, continue their oppression. The role of the 
critical rhetorician, then, would be to uncover the ways in which power is 
expressed in such cultural statements and, more importantly, to intervene and 
subsequently aid in the creation of a situation with more equitable power relations. 
The critique of freedom, according to McKerrow, accompanies the critique of 
domination in the production of critical rhetoric. It represents a philosophical 
position or attitude that is adopted by the critical rhetorician and is characterized 
by a "never-ending skepticism" that leads to a desire for "permanent criticism." 10 
In incorporating the critique of freedom with the critique of domination, the 
critical rhetorician is obliged to treat all judgments of power relations, domination, 
and oppression as temporary and contingent; it does not allow the critic to be 
content with the new conditions or new relations of power that have been created 
or influenced by his/her criticism. The critique of freedom is, in essence, the 
postmodern move in McKerrow's approach to rhetorical criticism. It forces the 
critical rhetorician to recognize that there is no way to avoid relations of power and 
hence, no way to put an end to domination. At best, the critic can help to shift 
power relations and, in so doing, temporarily alter the terms of domination. 
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Applied to the analysis of Affirmative Action policies, then, the critique of freedom 
requires the critical rhetorician to continuously re-examine and re-evaluate the 
merits of his/her conclusions regarding the ways in which Affirmative Action policy 
statements marginalize "minority" groups and thereby continue their oppression. 
The critical framework employed in this essay is an amended version ofMcKer-
row's approach to the production of critical rhetoric. This framework, which is 
discussed in greater detail in a recent essay by Kent Ono and I, II requires the critic 
to meld the critiques of domination and freedom into a single perspective on 
criticism. As such, the critic must first situate him or herself within his or her own 
culture and cultural constraints; and having done so, posit critiques with a telos in 
mind, "as if the direction chosen by the critic ... were Truth with a capital 'T.' 
Upon lifting pen, however, the critic must relinquish this 'Truth' in favor of a 
skepticism." 12 In this view, the critic gathers disparate fragments of discourse from 
within a culture and works "out an interpretation, a reading of a certain reality, 
that might be such that on one hand, this interpretation could produce some of the 
effects of truth; and on the other hand, these effects of truth could become 
implemented within possible struggles." 13 
In this essay, I have chosen to apply this critical framework to the current public 
discourse on the topic of alternative punishments. The fragments of discourse that 
I rely on to create my interpretation come from a comprehensive survey of 
newspaper and popular journal articles on the topic of alternative punishments 
published between 1985 and 1990.14 Three specific questions guide my examina-
tion of these discursive elements: (1) What is the purpose of punishment as it is now 
constructed? (2) What is the discursive space being created for "criminals?" and (3) 
What are the implications of these constructions on those who are imprisoned, or 
on those who avoid punishment by disciplining themselves to play within estab-
lished norms? The answers to these questions serve as the bases for my interpreta-
tion of how the concept of "alternative punishment" is being rhetorically con-
structed in our culture. 
The central claim advanced in this essay is that our society's understanding of 
the concept of alternative punishments emerges from the interstices of three pairs 
of arguments concerning the "proper" framing of criminal punishment. These 
pairs of arguments can be summarized as follows. First, while many agree that the 
traditional system of incarceration employed in this country is an ineffective means 
of punishing criminals, the reason for this failure is disputed. There are those who 
argue that the failure lies in the system's unwillingness to incarcerate criminals 
"long enough," while others attribute the failure to the system's role as a "graduate 
school of crime" where inmates learn new values, methods, and schemes that only 
serve to facilitate their return to crime. Second, the nature of the "criminal" itself is 
disputed. Criminals are alternatively depicted as misguided human beings in need 
of human aid and understanding, or as inherently flawed, less then human, 
individuals incapable of complete rehabilitation. Third, the solution to the crime 
problem is framed either as the need for tougher punishments and lengthier 
prison terms, or more effective (and humane) methods to assure the proper 
rehabilitation of misguided fellow humans. 
These three pairs of arguments, in effect, constitute two opposing philosophical 
views of the criminal-one seeing him/her as basically misguided, and therefore 
completely rehabilitable, and the other viewing him/her as inherently flawed and 
therefore incapable of complete rehabilitation. The remainder of this essay elabo-
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rates on the three pairs of arguments, and the two opposing philosophical 
positions underlying them, in an effort to illustrate how they serve to shape and 
constrain our construction and presentation of alternative forms of punishment. I 
believe critiques of this kind will become increasingly valuable and necessary as 
current economic factors encourage the development and utilization of alternative 
punishments. 
THE FAILURE OF THE INCARCERATION SYSTEM 
In his critique and analysis of disciplinary systems, Michel Foucault observes that 
in the early 1840s, French prisons were persistently criticized for their failure to 
reduce crime rates. Indeed, crime rates were not falling, recidivism remained 
steady, and "criminals" were creating networks of loyalties while imprisoned 
together. Further, the use of terms such as "delinquent" and "convict" to brand 
"former" lawbreakers made it more difficult for these subjects to return to 
"normal" society.15 Foucault claims that such criticisms led reformers to assert 
either that punishment was not being fully implemented or, in an overzealous 
attempt at total reform, to ignore punishment altogether. These same arguments, 
he contends, are destined to resurface as long as imprisonment is the major form of 
punishment. 
Indeed, Foucault's prediction appears to be confirmed in contemporary dis-
course on current disciplinary systems used in this country. The "failure" of the 
present penal system is attributed either to excessive leniency extended toward 
those who commit crime, or to the role that prisons play in teaching inmates to 
become better criminals. 
Arguments characterizing the current penal system as too lenient typically focus 
on the brevity of prison sentences. 16 James R. Klauser, chief advisor to the 
Governor of Wisconsin, argues that "If the courts are going to be sentencing 
people for longer terms and more serious crimes, the solution can't be to let them 
out sooner." 17 A Boston based judge explains that she refuses to allow criminals out 
of prison before their full terms have been served because shortened terms are 
almost always causally connected to future legal abuse; criminals cannot "learn 
their lesson" with short stays in prison. 18 Early release is also thought to send 
mixed messages to criminals and non-criminals alike. Edward Baumann, police 
chief of the village of Pewaukee notes, "I don't think we should step in and talk 
about early release before we consider everything else ... we're going to confuse 
society as to how we're going to deal with them."19 
Testimony from inmates and former inmates illustrates a recurrent consequence 
of a penal system that releases offenders before their full sentence is completed. 
"Criminals" implicate themselves as products of a system that not only minimally 
punished them, but also failed to "teach them their lessons." A twenty-year-old 
prisoner, identified as a Washington cocaine dealer back from his first one-year 
sentence, observes that "the penalties are the last thing you think about."20 
Following similar logic, an investigator of the prison crowding problem asserts that 
"in gang-plagued south central L.A., the word on the street is to turn yourself in if 
you're wanted for anything but a serious crime: L.A. County's Jail system is 
bursting at the seams and the prospect of a long stretch behind bars is remote."21 
The implication is, of course, that if criminals served adequate tenures in prison for 
their first offenses, a recidivism problem would not exist. Moreover, media 
presentations of sensationalized crimes committed by former inmates (such as the 
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Willie Horton case) are used to support the claim that those who are released from 
prison prematurely immediately return to a life of crime. 
A dialectical tension is created by opposing arguments that characterize prisons 
as little more than "graduate schools of crime"-places where people go to learn 
"to become failures."22 Expositions of prison overpopulation frequently note that 
more than 70 percent of the typical prison population are repeat offenders and the 
chances of a third return to prison are almost as great.23 Indeed, Nevada State 
Prison Director George Sumner claims that the failure of the prison system is due 
to excessively severe punishments for certain types of criminals. He argues that 
because both violent and nonviolent criminals are often assigned to the same penal 
institutions, non-violent criminals learn "violence." Sumner essentially argues that 
placing non-violent criminals in prison with their violent counterparts actually 
"causes" their return to society in a much hardened (and dangerous) form. 24 
Similarly, Kip Kautzky claims that if former convicts are not provided with 
rehabilitation counseling before their release, the knowledge they pick up in 
prison will encourage future criminal activity: "The way we are doing it is close to 
it:responsible. We put them on a greyhound bus with 100 dollars in their pockets, 
cross our fingers and hope they have the survival skills to make it on their own."25 
The only skill gained in prison is that of "criminality." 
The problem of recidivism, then, has been accounted for in two apparently 
contradictory ways: Either "delinquents" and "criminals" return to prison because 
their punishments are too lenient to teach them "their lessons," or the prison 
environment provides prisoners with the opportunity and means to learn the 
norms and practical skills of criminal behavior. These opposing positions essen-
tially reflect divergent social constructions of "prisoners," the functions prisons 
serve, and how alternatives to punishment are framed. 
THE HUMAN AND THE OTHER 
The second pair of arguments is closely related to the first. We find that those 
who argue against early release also tend to portray the prisoner as more-or-Iess 
inhuman in nature. Arguments of this type serve as the basis for defenses against 
charges that prison conditions are often unfit for human occupants. Indeed, when 
the city of Boston was accused in 1988 of maintaining prison conditions that 
contributed to "cruel and unusual punishment," city and prison officials were 
rhetorically placed in a position of having to defend prison conditions by depicting 
the prisoners as "not human." In effect, Boston officials argued that the so-called 
"inhumane" conditions of their prisons were actually superior to the living 
conditions that their prisoners had to endure in their "normal" lives. As one 
individual put it, prisoners "get three meals a day, most get better medical 
attention than they ever had, they get education, and we're doing all the things 
we're supposed to do."26 
Arguments are also advanced that directly deny the necessity of improving 
prison conditions: "The concept that all criminals can be rehabilitated has been 
discredited and there is a core of sociopaths who can't be changed, only held out of 
the community until they are past their high crime years."27 Labeled as being 
incapable of full rehabilitation, the criminal is seen as a wild and unruly animal 
who has no potential for, and therefore no need of, redemption. In Connecticut, a 
state experimenting with early release systems, Correction Commissioner Larry R. 
Meachum asks, "How would you like your entire reputation and career to be 
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hanging in the balance of 2,300 losers on any given day?"28 His question poi-
gnantly and succinctly constructs a simple fact about contemporary society: Those 
arrested and successfully prosecuted for crimes emerge from sentencing not 
simply as "convicted criminals," but also as "losers" who are unable to cope in 
"normal" society. 
Arguments that cast the criminal as someone less than human are in conflict with 
arguments that call for the reincorporation of the criminal into the human family. 
As Kip Kautsky observes: "The focal point is what happens when an inmate is 
released. The community has to be served but we're talking about a guy's life."29 
We often find that at least the "nonviolent" portion of the prison population is 
constructed as fundamentally misguided human beings. 3D In such cases, inmates 
are often brought forth to attest to their own humanity. Jose Martinez, a resident of 
an overcrowded prison, is described as a hardworking student studying English in 
order to make his reentry into society an easy one; he desires a "normal" job on the 
outside upon his release. Martinez's testimony depicts the current prison system as 
working against his attempt to normalize himself and cultivate his humanity. Of his 
struggles to learn English, Martinez notes: "To study is too hard ... There are too 
many people. I think this is against the law to have all these people in here."31 
Through Martinez, prisoners are constructed as industrious humans being legally 
denied the opportunity to exercise their humanity. 
The difference between violent and non-violent criminals is often emphasized to 
argue that only violent criminals should spend any time in prison. Donald Murray, 
Legal Representative of the National Association of Counties, testifies that certain 
criminals "are not dangerous. There are a lot of community options that need to be 
developed for prisoners who present no threat to community."32 Colorado Gover-
nor Roy Romer clearly delineates two types of criminals, those who are violent and 
cannot be reformed and those who are non-violent and are a "safe bet" for 
rehabilitation programs.33 The non-violent segment of the prison population is, in 
fact, symbolically tied to the "human" segments of society: "When a nonviolent 
middle class white offender comes up for sentencing, judges and the public readily 
accept the idea that an alternative, like community service, is a good idea ... Why 
can't the same thing be true for many ofthe poor thieves and burglars who fill our 
prison warehouses?"34 In this bifurcation, then, prisoners essentially gain or lose 
their humanity based on the the way we rhetorically construct the severity of their 
crime. 
PUNISHMENT OR REHABILITATION 
The third pair of arguments regarding punishment systems parallels the first 
two. Arguments that depict criminals as inhuman, and claim that recidivism is the 
result of inadequate punishment, also call for more stringent sentencing policies as 
the only effective solution to problems of crime. Alternatively, arguments that 
depict criminals as misguided humans who only learn to commit crimes more 
efficiently as a result of their inappropriate or unduely long prison sentences, call 
for alternative forms of punishment. 
Arguments against early release usually assert that heftier prison sentences are 
the only feasible way to reduce the frequency of crimes. Such a view is exemplified 
in the notion that "in order to preserve the threat of punishment for lawbreakers," 
it is necessary to build more prisons and enforce lengthier sentences; otherwise, 
"criminals" will have no incentive to cease their "lives of crime."35 Furthermore, 
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rehabilitation is a non-consideration from this perspective- punishment alone is 
what is required. Hence, former California Governor Deukmejian found the 
argument for more prison space to be an effective political strategy against his 
Democratic opponents. Deukmejian, depicting the currently overcrowded prisons 
as powder kegs on the verge of spontaneous explosion, describes a very dangerous 
future scenario that can only be avoided if Democrats are willing to appropriate 
funds for new prisons. He warns his opposition that they alone will bear the 
responsibility for felons who, upon early release, turn to bloodshed in the streets.36 
Again, the need for rehabilitation into "normal" adult life is moot since "proper" 
behavior is inconceivable-that is, fugitives of all types are expected to immedi-
ately turn to crime, rape, and murder upon release.37 
Arguments of this type create scenarios having only one workable solution. 
Deukmejian, for instance, presents his constituents with a problem that has the 
creation of more prison space as the only viable course of action. In fact, criminolo-
gist Franklin Zimring testifies that "the increased visibility of the justice system 
makes the political risks of being visibly lenient on convicts substantially higher 
than the risks of being ostensibly tough."38 A rhetorical reality has been created in 
which "criminals" are viewed as high risks in rehabilitation programs. This 
rhetorical reality also portrays lawmakers as too lenient on criminals, and presents 
prison systems as persistently ineffective in reducing recividism. 
A problem arises, however, because lengthier sentences are being legislated for 
the "prisoners" of the war on drugs while prisons are being simultaneously 
deemed ineffective. While those who support lengthier prison sentences have 
created an argument that leaves little room for alternative solutions, economic 
conditions are making alternative sentencing programs a necessity; the needs of 
the symbolic and the economic worlds are in conflict. As a result, justification and 
rhetorical construction of alternative forms of punishment as replacements for 
prison terms must be constructed as both punishment and rehabilitation, treating 
the criminal as both human and inhuman at the same time, in order to show that 
these systems punish "hard" enough but also "teach" criminals enough to prevent 
recidivism. 
The rhetorical ground does, of course, exist for the inclusion of rehabilitation as 
an important element of disciplinary systems. An advisor to the U.S. Justice 
Department notes, for example, that "when people get upset because people don't 
go to jail, then it's pretty clear to me the focus is on punishment. But the public also 
is not for punishment without rehabilitation."39 Moreover, Tony Travisond of 
American Correction Institutions provides another aspect of this tension in observ-
ing that "the prison cell is a very costly situation and no one should go in it unless 
he commits a heinous act, is a career criminal, or repeat offender."40 In short, the 
clashing of urges for punishment and rehabilitation, combined with the economic 
pressures for alternative forms of punishment, establish the rhetorical battle-
ground on which the solution emerges. The principal rhetors in this struggle 
include institution representatives, judicial officers, and even criminals themselves. 
Recognizing the need to make alternative punishments palatable to legislators 
and the public at large, institutions responsible for such alternatives present them 
in a form that highlights the need to integrate punishment and rehabilitation. 
When alternative punishment programs are proposed and utilized, they are often 
given names such as "Community Penalty Program" that emphasize the 
"punishing" aspect of the programs, while downplaying the notion that such 
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alternatives are an "easy ride" for criminals.41 Herbert Heltuer, Director of the 
National Center for Alternatives, observes that his principal problem in getting 
people to accept alternative punishments is a rhetorical one: "We're all against 
crime," he notes, "but we need to convince people that there are other ways to get 
justice."42 Further, the public's perception of prison as the only acceptable form of 
punishment is labeled by one official as "dangerous": "Punishment begins with any 
denial offreedom; it doesn't have to include incarceration in ajail or prison."43 
Those who have sentenced criminals to alternative forms of punishment suggest 
that these alternatives are effective because they force criminals to confess publicly 
to their transgressions. In this way, criminals are inadvertently used by the court 
system to define for society, what will and will not be accepted, as well as what is 
and is not moral behavior. For example, an Albany, Oregon man, who failed to 
appear in court on charges of theft, was required to take out several ads in the local 
newspaper admitting his crimes and apologizing to the community. The District 
Attorney who asked for that particular alternative punishment asserted that he 
wanted to make the punishment "more direct, more public, and more 
embarrassing."44 Similarly, in Florida, those convicted of driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol are required to display a red and white glow-in-the-dark bumper 
sticker that reads: "Convicted DUI Restricted License." The judge who initiated 
this program notes that "Ifreputation is such a big thing, then maybe this can be a 
deterrent. Public humiliation is one of the big things that has been overlooked."45 
Each of these examples represents an alternative punishment that forces the 
criminal to place his or her crime before the public, ask for their forgiveness, and 
present the crime as a concrete representation of behavior that will not be tolerated 
by society. 
Offenders who have undergone alternative punishments often testiry to their 
effectiveness. While Maria Arnford speaks of the electronic monitoring system as 
"the parent she never had," others construct out of such programs a harsh 
parental surveyor who shapes them once again into productive and healthy 
citizens. A I9-year-old who violated his probation and was subsequently sentenced 
to serve time in a Georgia "bootcamp" asserts, "When I came through the front 
door, I had become a man in about 30 seconds. I wish I had come here the first 
time I got in trouble. "46 Mter undergoing a program that forced an I8-year-old to 
maintain steady employment or return to prison, the young man declared after his 
first promotion, "I felt so proud. I went and told my mother and she felt better, 
like, you know, maybe now I can get a new start."47 This program is thus portrayed 
as providing the individual with not only a new start on life, but also reuniting him 
with his family as well. In effect, then, the testimonies of criminals who have 
participated in various alternative punishments serve to rhetorically construct 
these alternatives as "rehabilitating criminals" and "moving them toward being 
more responsible citizens." 
CONCLUSIONS 
A long tradition of critical theorists have attempted to understand and explain 
the relationship between mass mediated forms of communication and human 
behavior, noting alternatively its potentially dominating, liberating, or altering 
influence on subjects. Horkheimer and Adorno warned of the impending ideolog-
ical grasp of the culture industries.48 Marcuse argued that television and radio 
advertising would create repressed needs, invading individuals in their homes in 
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order to dictate behavior and action. Fiske and others have taken optimism in the 
subject's ability to read potentially liberating messages in mediated events; Condit 
has questioned the limits of liberation through such reading.49 Foucault has 
abstracted the argument to a larger cultural level in asserting that our society has 
increasingly become a carceral one; a "panoptical" society in which a normalizing 
gaze is persistently directed on each of us. He maintains that we learn to act as 
instruments of the gaze, disciplining each other for abnormal behavior. We are 
each normalized through standardized tests, rating systems, confessions, television 
shows, and interpersonal cues.50 We tightly constrain what behavior we will accept 
from each other and hence, tightly constrain what we as a "people" will be. 
Building from this notion, Poster has investigated the potential of new commu-
nication technologies to act as systems of surveillance. Combining his interest with 
Baudrillard's account of the effects of new communication instruments (e.g., 
computers, television, credit systems), Poster warns that we may have entered the 
age of the "Super Panopticon;" an age in which the use of surveillance is elevated 
to a level where resistance is impossible. 51 With information about phone calls, 
library books, credit usage, and everyday choices all recorded by computers, it is 
far easier for the subject to be monitored. In effect, his/her spatial, temporal, and 
personality changes can be noted immediately and simultaneously. If Poster's 
notion contains any degree of truth, the importance of an investigation of the 
rhetorical positioning of these new technologies as they pertain to actual forms of 
discipline and punishment is a high priority. In the case of electronic home 
monitoring devices and urine testing, for example, the publication of Marie 
Arnford's childlike adoration is a telling one. Marie Arnford welcomes Poster's 
Super Panopticon, a system that persists in watching her every move, including 
monitoring her bodily intake, as a welcome parental influence. She, in effect, 
testifies to the virtues of George Orwell's "Big Brother." 
If we hold that there are no true "selves," only discursively created subject 
positions, the implications of the public presentation of Arnford's adoration of the 
parent become clear. As Charland notes in his study ofthe peuple quebecois, it is only 
after a position is created discursively and publicly that individuals can "take on" 
that position. By agreeing to take on the name "quebecois," for example, a subject 
agrees to take on its meanings, to become an example of the term, to become an 
effect of the discourse. 52 The implications and conclusions of this investigation, 
then, must necessarily comment on the ways in which the rhetorical construction 
of alternative systems of punishment encourage us to willingly take on the subject 
positions and morals being offered within the culture of the Super Panopticon. 
If we are to accept the constructionist assertion that a concept is as a concept 
does,53 this essay becomes a theory of punishment in our society; a theory, 
moreover, with frighteningly pervasive implications. Through the dialectical ten-
sions that surround our carceral system, the new discourse of punishment emerges. 
The first practical conclusion to be drawn from this investigation is the support it 
provides for what some have argued to be a breakdown of the public and private 
spheres through the intervention of the "state." Offe notes that the "state," 
through its public health programs, attempts to prescribe for individuals what can 
and cannot be eaten, how much sleep is necessary, how much alcohol can be 
consumed, etc. 54 LaClau and Mouffe, positing the post-structural view of subjectiv-
ity as the creation of discursive articulations, are concerned with how all public 
discourse influences the way we constitute our "selves."55 The importance of this 
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study, therefore, lies not in outlining the specific details of our contemporary 
construction of the criminal and his/her appropriate punishment; but instead, in 
illustrating how rhetorical and economical pressures have combined to construct 
alternative forms of punishment that ask everyone to endorse the disciplinary 
systems of the state. That is, these constructions are seen as necessarily moving 
each of us, both morally and physically, away from delinquency and toward a 
"normal" and "correct" way oflife. 
Second, the fact that those who are presented with and undergo alternative 
forms of punishment praise their virtues, and express regret that they did not 
experience it sooner, provides the basis for potentially frightening implications on 
the question of resistance. I do not deny that a system of home monitoring and 
urine testing could potentially change the patterns ofa drug offender's life "for the 
better." However, by rhetorically presenting such punishment treatments as 
guardians (or "parents") to be happily submitted to, resistance to domination 
appears questionable at best. The testimonies of those who have undergone 
alternative punishment programs provide evidence that, at the very least, they 
wish to constitute their "selves" according to the "state's" definition of normality 
after having gone through the programs. These individuals are more likely to 
deem their previous worldviews as warped, while viewing those of the parental 
program as closer to what is truly "right." If we are incapable of recognizing that 
judgments of "normality" are inherent in legal definitions of right and wrong; and 
instead, see it as natural and something to be desired, there is little or no chance for 
resistance. It is only when we know or can be shown that normalization is taking 
place that resistance is possible. The most problematic move in this emerging 
construction of punishment, then, is that it presents itself as a process almost to be 
desired. Considering that many of the alternative forms of punishment are 
contingent on electronic home monitoring, Dubiel's claim that television monitors 
have become a far reaching extension of Horkheimer and Adorno's culture 
industry rings true. 56 
Third, if those who already abide by social laws witness "outlaws" testirying to the 
benefits of the prison system in incorporating them back into society, the law 
abiding citizen is more likely to view his or her own behavior as unquestionably 
more agreeable, natural, and appealing. Mter all, those who are subjected to 
systems of punishment testiry that the system is useful, providing the discipline 
they need and making them more responsible. No one is left unaffected by 
disciplinary procedures when they are constructed in this light. Even those who 
stand outside of formal systems of punishment are forced to confront the notion 
that disciplinary procedures as a whole are for their benefit. By staying within the 
law, we are behaving as we should. Just as children tend to view their parents as 
omnipotent during the socialization process, so does the discourse of punishment 
encourage us to view the repressive and ideological state apparatuses as not only 
natural, but also as a loving attempt to facilitate the return of the prodigal son. 
In regards to the work of rhetorical critics, this essay points to several other 
conclusions. First, as I noted earlier, much of the work done in communication 
studies utilizing concepts borrowed from Foucault and poststructuralism, in 
general, has been limited to theoretical translation. This essay and others, most 
notably LaFountain's analysis of the discourse of Dr. Ruth, illustrate the fertility of 
transforming poststructuralist discourse into "creative" criticism.57 That is, it is 
rare to find critics utilizing theoretical works in an attempt to actually "do" 
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poststructuralist critique. Instead, we have witnessed a number of arguments over 
the meaning and relative import of poststructuralism. If one of our tasks as 
rhetorical critics is to provide critiques of our social world, we must at some point 
utilize our interpretations of theory in order to bring forth these critiques. An essay 
like this one helps illustrate that such a critique does offer benefits that differ from 
more established perspectives. Indeed, this essay illustrates, by example, how 
those who study communication have implicit ties to poststructuralist discourse 
theories. 
Second, as Condit notes, studies of this kind point to the importance of 
diachronic analyses that include the discourses of various perspectives and voices. 58 
That is, rather than attempting to follow individual speakers who are predeter-
mined to be important, a "critical rhetoric" perspective encourages an examina-
tion of changes that occur in discourse over time and that emerge culturally rather 
than from individual speakers. It encourages the critic to look at a variety of 
discourses in an attempt to "gather fragments" and generate a narrative of the 
creation of the discursive objects under study. Such criticisms force us to move 
toward comprehensiveness in the collection of cultural fragments in order to see 
how alternatives to punishment arise in and through the "rules" of discourse 
concerning punishment in general. This gathering of fragments is, in effect, the 
contemporary theory of alternatives to incarceration. The concentration is less on 
the question "Who is talking about alternatives to punishment?" and more on the 
question "What are alternatives to punishment?" While this is not the only 
question the critic might ask, it is one that provides us with fairly clear and 
interesting insights. In this particular case, it illustrates that as a culture we might 
wish to put more thought and concern into our responses to the question of 
alternative punishments. 
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